Bereft of Imagination?
6 April 2005
SRA
Chairman Richard Bowker told a Select Committee on 8 July 2003, that BR
managers - by inference, all - were “bereft of imagination”. The
Select Committee’s Report does not mention how that conclusion was
reached. I have not been quizzed on my performance nor has anyone to whom I
have spoken. Every industry has unimaginative managers. Motor cycle industry
managers did not foresee the popularity of small motor cycles, opening the door
to the Japanese and Italians, who consigned
Some disagreed with Richard
Bowker:
Tory
MP, Michael Stephen: I do not subscribe to the view the railway is badly
managed. I have been impressed by BR senior and middle-level managers; they are
excellent, dedicated people.[5]
Other MPs who praised BR include Robert Adley (formerly Transport Select
Committee chairman), Adrian Bayley, Nick Harvey, Nigel Spearing, Sir Keith
Speed, William Vane, Brian Wilson and John MacGregor [6], Garnett, Chief
Executive of GNER said “BR was bloody efficient”.[7]
“BR
managers were very effective in dissuading staff from industrial action.
Today’s managers do not have the same skills. Many [current] staff
believe managers are incompetent, and know little about railways. One man has
seven so-called managers: ‘Under InterCity, I had one. I knew what to do
and who to report to. Now, I haven’t a clue’. Running a rail service
came as a shock to those from the bus industry who thought it would be a
passage to easy profits”. [8]
“Stop
treating comparison with BR as irrelevant. BR had many faults, but delivered
probably the most cost effective railway of its type in the world. There is
much to be learned from its history and little to be gained by routinely
dismissing comparisons between then and now”. [9]
Areas in
which BR did lack imagination
Investment
BR
gave priority to infrastructure, not shops which congest concourses. New boys
have convinced the public that new rolling stock & assets are funded by the
private sector, when taxpayers fund most through bigger subsidies! Moreover,
the average age of rolling stock is worse than under
Connex
envisaged creating “humane standing room” in coaches by replacing
67 seats by 32! “They are recruiting a manager to sell this to the
public”. [11] Unimaginative BR focused on trying to provide more seats by
lengthening trains or running additional services.
“For
three decades BR infrastructure projects cost £5m per mile, usually minus
a bit. Now West Coast route modernisation is £16-23m per mile. The
project is two years late and five times the original cost”. [12]
Performance
To
improve punctuality, BR didn’t extend journey times, break connections
[13] or miss advertised station calls, leaving passengers on platforms and
carrying others beyond their destination. Nor did we calculate millions of
minutes delay. Improving punctuality needs attention to individual trains.
There is a vast difference between telling the public that x% of trains are
punctual, and blinding them with millions of minutes delay cut by z%, which may
leave train punctuality unchanged or worse.
BR’s
unified Control Office organisation – which managed day-today
performance, connections, etc, - was abolished, and, later, replaced by less
effective separate bodies.
Up
to the day before privatisation, incompetence was deemed to be the cause of all
train delays. The next day, ‘decrepit stock’ was the cause! BR punctuality
was better than that achieved now [14] despite calls being missed and
connections broken under the new imaginative regime.
Unimaginative
BR managers did not plead “circumstances beyond our control” -
which would have been jeered. Now,
it is the number one excuse. When I tried to compare rail to bus services,
National Express would not supply the basis of schedules nor punctuality
records, but said most delays were due to “circumstances beyond our
control”. BR - they believed - had no similar excuse to theirs: human
error, sickness, foul weather, defective private sector made equipment,
vandalism, congestion and accidents - despite road vehicles crashing into
bridges or onto the line! With no hint he realised the irony of his remark,
Trevor Smallwood, Chairman of
FirstBus which planned to go into railways said trains must be reliable!
Locally, FirstBus services are a byword for unreliability.
BR
managers did not realise that blocking lines for months was “less
inconvenient”, whilst millions extended journey times and changed twice
or thrice. It is claimed that weekend possessions give only a few hours work.
If a BR engineer had made such a defeatist claim, he would have been told to
find employment more suited to his limited talents! Long blockages are said to
save £0.5bn. The unanswered question is what would otherwise be the cost,
and over what period and mileage. It may be 0.001% of estimated engineering
cost over 25 years, but what of other costs - e.g., buses - and lost revenue.
On average, BR renewed track every 25 years or so, mostly during 16 hour
weekend blockages in which up to 14 hours work was safely done - the balance
being required to safely take possession, get track machines and trains to
site, and restore lines safely to traffic. Railtrack extended renewals to an
average 125 years [15] causing a dangerous backlog. Now, possessions fail to
end on time, “due to a safety problem”. The public has not grasped
that the same scenario will occur somewhere annually, and in the same places
every 25 years or so. Imaginative PR will dress it up in differently. In the
bad old days, BR engineers had to hand back on time, with safety guaranteed.
Current
long blockages are not remotely similar to the 7-week blockage at
It
is claimed that blockages of four track routes - where BR kept two tracks open
- is required by the H&SE - but they say it is a railway decision. It is
unclear why men may work safely on motorways protected by cones, but not
railways. Cones do not prevent vehicles swerving into workers, railway lines
do, and train drivers obey safety speed limits.
“The
SRA will thin out trains to ease congestion and help trains run on time .... so
a problem with one train doesn’t delay others” [16]. “Inter
city face cuts in frequency to drag railways out of a three year punctuality
slump. Long distance operators run too many lightly used services which congest
the network and delay other trains”.[17] It has taken eight years for
imaginative new managers to learn a lesson applied by BR for decades.
Imaginative
new boys are planning to partially re-merge what should not have been
fragmented. Ministers were warned by their backbenchers that fragmentation
would be catastrophic. The much misquoted Brussels Directive 91/440 did require
it - requiring only separate train and infrastructure accounts. It was never
mentioned during privatisation debates as a reason for fragmentation.
Complaints
BR
lacked the imagination to re-designate “complaints” as
“comments”, “observations” or “invited
feedback”, as now applies. I tried to relate complaints to journeys as a
measure, but watchdogs would not wear it. Now, they accept it, as
“complaints are low in percentage terms”. The current percentage is
100 times BR’s in my day.[18] We didn’t imply that passengers
wasted time and postage: “Thank you for taking the time and trouble to
send your comments” is a typical private sector response now adopted by
train companies to an unambiguous complaint.
Fares & Inquiries
Long
distance fares rose twice as fast as inflation and are likely to rise further.
The £3.4bn in fares [in 2003/4] is half of rail costs. The SRA believes
fares must rise to force people outside the peak.[19] Unimaginative BR managers
cut off-peak fares to tempt passengers outside the peak! The SRA said:
“the cap of inflation minus 1% is unsustainable and is harming the
industry. The cap should be inflation plus 2%”.[20] Given inflation minus
1%, BR would have been £11 billions better off.[21]
Newcomers
imaginatively publicise book-ahead, train-specific fares, but not soaring
walk-on fares. In the BR era, watchdogs demanded equal fares for all. Having
trumpeted plans to simplify fares with fewer confusing options, they have
increased from BR’s typical 4-5 options to 13-15! [22]
Imaginative
newcomers limit staff who answer calls, to basic inquiries to expedite
answering. This leads to many making two or more calls: to NRES and to a train
company to see if any cheap tickets are left. There, one suffers the
time-consuming obstacle course of a “voice activated service” and
push button options. NRES refer enquiries regarding carpark fees to a train
company, who refer one to a station - whose ex-directory number they do not
have! Delay in answering these extra calls is excluded from statistics
comparing NRES with BR, making it appear that enquiries are answered quicker.
NRES cannot give addresses of Rail Watchdogs, which should reduce complaints.
Contentious calls are referred to backroom staff - “who will be with you
in a minute”.
Subsidy
BR
managers lacked the imagination to double the subsidy [23] by splitting
profitable InterCity into seven unprofitable companies. Likewise, splitting
Network SouthEast - which had cut its subsidy and achieved parity - into eleven
unprofitable companies. The imagination to quintuple subsidies was way beyond
BR skills! Newcomers claim that subsidies should increase as there are more
passengers - largely due to economic upturn! Increased business should cut
subsidies. BR managers would have delivered a gold plated railway for current
subsidies.[24]
Politicians
forecast that imaginative entrepreneurs would need lower subsidies. BR
repeatedly told Ministers that commuter trains were expensive due to the peaks,
but lacked the imagination to convince Ministers that this required more
subsidy and higher fares, which newcomers have claimed. If their imagination
fails them - “they [train companies] are protected against decline: the
Franchising Director will increase subsidies if passengers
reduce!”[25] InterCity companies
should defer boasts of paying a premium, until they have repaid - with interest
- subsidies hitherto paid, as BR’s InterCity was unsubsidised
“The
cost of maintaining railways soared under Railtrack. The bill has been paid by
taxpayers. The SRA propped up companies with extra subsidies and is keen to see
them have more freedom on fares”.[26] The SRA recognises there is a limit
to risk that companies will take.”[27]
GB
Railways was bailed out by £3.8m extra subsidy. Go-Ahead sought
re-negotiation of a loss-making franchise.
BR
lacked the imagination to pursue bustitution without a subsidy cut. If BR was
allowed to withdraw a train service, the subsidy was cut at once. For 20 years,
if a bus company provided a replacement service, BR had to subsidise them, even
though BR was not then subsidised. BR would not have had the imagination to
farm out 1200 route miles to local groups using unpaid labour, or replacing
trains by buses, whilst keeping the subsidy! That is imaginative!
John
MacGregor said: “We have chosen to subsidise operators, not Railtrack.
Subsidy is best directed at the continued provision of socially necessary
passenger services which might otherwise disappear. Railtrack will operate on
commercial lines, making an appropriate return”.[29] He stated: “If
- this is entirely hypothetical - a franchisee runs into problems, he will be
able to return to discuss the contract. In the unlikely event of a failure of
the franchisee, the franchising authority will find alternative operators for
the franchise”.[30]
Inevitably, they would want a bigger subsidy.
National
Express will buy more buses and rationalise its interests in trains after
another sobering year. “If we don’t think we are going to get a
return out of a bid, we will walk away”.[31] That’s private sector
imagination and enterprise!
One
excuse to justify rocketing subsidies is that track had not been renewed since
the 1960s - the West Coast route was highlighted. West Coast rails were renewed
about every 20 years or so, on a rolling programme.
Monopoly
Unimaginative
BR managers failed to convince Ministers that there was no BR monopoly.
Ministers had admitted BR had no monopoly fifty years ago.[32] New boys told
politicians that there was a profusion of external competition. Politicians
were then convinced.
Whereas,
government permit private sector train operators to operate buses, BR could not
operate buses as feeders or alternatives. When buses were needed after an
accident or to replace late or cancelled trains, BR paid top dollar!
Areas in which BR managers were
imaginative
Productivity
From
1948, managers continually developed ways to cut costs and improve performance.
Under privatisation, whizz kids came in and sacked staff, and had to cancel
thousands of trains. “Through the 1980s Bob Reid [34] expected 3%
year-on-year efficiency savings from managers - if not - you were replaced by
someone who could”.[35]
Advisors
BR
created a profitable consultancy [36] employing BR managers and engineers on
secondment, to meet demands from eighty countries to solve operating, planning,
engineering, technical and other problems. It also sold BR designed equipment
and products. New boys employ advisors from countries which sought BR advice!
Investment
BR
train design staff had the imagination to liaise at an early stage with those
responsible for infrastructure, avoiding the risk that trains could not be used
due to inadequate power supplies or a need to re-build platforms.
Imaginative
BR managers and engineers developed: car-sleepers, Parkway stations; driver
simulators, HST (at service frequencies well in advance of the world), MGR
non-stop coal trains, freightliner (precipitating a container revolution), slab
track (benefiting private sector Eurotunnel), point heaters, new bogies, solid
state interlocking, improved electric transmission systems [37], ticket
machines, new lubricants, track maintenance machines, call centre booking and
much more.[38]
BR
asset renewals practice minimised track defects. BR engineers had the sense to
apply different maintenance and renewal standards to track and signalling on
inter city and rural lines. The new boys have now discovered “it made no
sense to apply the same standards used on 125mph InterCity lines to rural
railways.”[39]
Under
career railwayman Sir Henry Johnson, BR set up a rolling stock leasing company
in 1971, but was told by the Treasury to terminate it in 1975.[40]. Under
privatisation, the Treasury designated leasing as flavour of the month.
Accidents
BR
managers had the imagination not to involve lawyers and accountants in
accidents. BR developed contingency plans - revised with each timetable change
- for use if a line was blocked by accident, floods, lorries on the line,
suicides, etc. The Control organisation was empowered to make decisions and
implement these plans. Controls had been subject to economies and modernisation
over many years. Accidents such as
that at Southall would have been avoided had newcomers retained unified
Controls. Still, credit where it is due, ten years after destroying the unified
Control structure, they are moving towards re-integrated Control - and making
it sound like a new idea!
Fares
Imaginative
BR managers introduced railcards for senior citizen, students, young persons,
family and disabled; Savers, Weekend First and London Travelcard, etc. They
lacked the imagination to copyright these ideas, allowing newcomers to infer
that they are a product of privatisation. This is remarkable, because Ministers
only agreed that Railcards would be retained after a revolt by backbenchers,
who feared that Cards would disappear. “Train companies imposed
conditions that make the South East railcard useless for 90%
journeys”.[41]
Safety
BR
managers had the imagination to rely on the skills of low graded staff, such as
a track patrolman, who was empowered to enter a signalbox or signalling centre
and block a line or impose a speed restriction for safety reasons without
higher authority. Confident that staff would perform their duties with the
skill born of experience, we didn’t panic when one restriction was
imposed, and impose thousands elsewhere. After an accident, BR managers safely
restored lines to traffic much quicker than applies today, having first
established the cause.
Reality or Perception
The
Reality is that private sector imagination has led to higher subsidies, more
complaints, worse safety worse performance and a higher average age of rolling
stock [42]. A SRA Policy Statement stated that franchisees failed to achieve
what was promised under privatisation, that several have not been viable and
have been given extra subsidy. “The extent to which risk has transferred
to the private sector is questionable”.
Mr.
Bowker told a Select Committee that “the current perception of services
is poor, but it is not the reality”. In fact, the Reality is that the
public now see that they have a service that is worse than under BR; [42] and
that, it was then that they had the misleading perception, when there was
nothing with which to compare. Stimulated by the media, they were led to
believe that railways would become
MPs
complained that BR’s last London-Berwick train was 6.30pm. Imaginative
newcomers retimed it to 6.0pm, and have not - as MPs expected [43] - reinstated
direct overnight sleepers from Berwick to
“Cost
control is now so weak that upgrading costs nearly three times as much as under
BR. Privatisation has achieved none of the promised benefits. It hasn’t
improved services, reduced public funding or made managers more responsive to
customers”.[44] “Too many suffer dirty overcrowded trains with
unusable lavatories and are starved of essential information when services go
wrong. Franchises should re-written with financial incentives to run cleaner,
more user-friendly operations. Services go downhill when managers spend more
time bidding for each other’s networks than concentrating on boring old
punctuality and reliability”.[45] Surely, the incentive is supposed to be
implicit in private sector operation?
3.12.04
[1] Britain’s Railways - The Reality,
p.91
[2] For a classic example of
excessive industrial wages - see
[3] I once asked a critic: “Which perfect
bloody industry do you work for?” - a question posed often since. It is a
great conversation stopper
[4]
[5] Hansard 24 May 1993, cols 646-647
[6] During the debate on his privatisation Bill
[7] Rail No. 466
[8] Railway World, March 2002
[9] Modern Railways, January 2003
[10]
[11] The Times 5 August 2002
[12] Modern Railways, January 2003, p.20
[13] BR listed some trains that may be held for a pre-determined
margin, if connection could be made. Others had no margin, to avoid the
snowball effect, which politicians assumed was overlooked
[14]
[15] Railway World, April 1996
[16] Sunday Telegraph 19 January 2003
[17] Daily Telegraph 17 June 2003
[18]
[19] Under unimaginative BR, fares 1989-95 covered
85% of costs. See BRB Report 1994/5
[20] Daily Telegraph 19 July 2002
[21]
[22] See BR and current Fares Manuals
[23] BRB Annual Report 1994/5, p.5
[24] The Times, 21 January 2004
[25] Daily Telegraph 18 May 1995
[26] The Times 19 July 2002
[27] Daily Telegraph 7 September 2002
[28] Respectively: Daily Telegraph 19 June 2002; 28
March, 13 May & 12 July 2003; Times 28 June 2003
[29] Hansard 2 February 1993. Railtrack could not
manage without subsidies
[30] Hansard 14 July 1992, col 979
[31] Daily Telegraph 14 March 2003
[32] Blueprints
for Bankruptcy, pp.48, 50
[33] Hansard, vol. 216, col. 772
[34] He was the second - and last - career manager to
run BR
[35] Modern Railways, January 2003, p.21
[36] Transmark earned the Queens Award for exports.
“
[37] The technology was sold abroad. Since
privatisation, Eurostar trains caused damage on the East Coast due to them
having incompatible pantographs
[38]
[39] The Times 27 February 2004
[40]
[41] Private Eye No. 1056 June 2002
[42]
[43] Hansard 11.7.91, cols 1148-52
[44] Private Eye No 1056 June 2002
[45] Richard Bowker, Daily Telegraph 4 December 2002